Who Created Evil: A brief theodicy

Since one of the main objectives of marriage is to address the many habits of sin, in order to explain the purpose of marriage it has been necessary to explore the origin of evil. I thought I would write a separate paper on my findings. I begin with an excerpt from a discussion on Leibniz’s theodicy. (A theodicy is an argument for the coexistence of God and evil.)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)

Leibniz on the Problem of Evil
First published Sun Jan 4, 1998;
substantive revision Wed Feb 27, 2013

“3. The Holiness Problem

Far less scholarly attention has been devoted to Leibniz's treatment of the holiness problem, if only because this conception of the problem has only recently been recognized by Leibniz scholars. As noted above, the main problem here is that God's character seems to be stained by evil because God causally contributes to the existence of everything in the world, and evil is one of those things. [For two recent treatments see Sleigh (1996) and Murray (2005)]

The standard solution adopted by medieval thinkers was to deny an assumption of the preceding argument, namely, that evil is “something.” Evil was claimed not to have any positive reality, but to be a mere “privation” or “lack” of being. On such a view, evil has no more reality than the hole in the center of a donut. Making a donut does not require putting together two components, the cake and the hole: the cake is all that there is to the donut, and the hole is just the “privation of cake.” It therefore would be silly to say that making the donut requires causing both the cake and the hole to exist. Causing the cake to exist causes the hole as a “by-product” of causing a particular kind of cake to exist. Thus, we need not assume any additional cause for the hole beyond that assumed for the causing of the cake.

“The upshot of our pastry analogy is this: given that evil, like the hole, is merely a privation, it requires no cause (or as the medievals, and Leibniz, liked to say, it needs no “cause per se”). God does not “causally contribute to the existence of evil” because evil per se is not a thing and therefore requires no cause in order to exist. And since God does not cause the existence of evil, God cannot be causally implicated in evil. Thus, the holiness problem evaporates.

“Early in his philosophical career, Leibniz, like other seventeenth-century philosophers, scoffed at this solution to the holiness problem. In a short piece entitled “The Author of Sin,” Leibniz explains why he thinks the privation response to the holiness problem fails. Leibniz argues that God is the author of all that is real and positive in the world, and that God is therefore also the “author” of all of privations in the world. “It is a manifest illusion to hold that God is not the author of sin because there is no such thing as an author of a privation, even though he can be called the author of everything which is real and positive in the sinful act” [A.6.3.150].

“Leibniz explains why he takes this response to be a “manifest illusion,” through the consideration of an example. Suppose that a painter creates two paintings that are identical in every respect, except that the one is a scaled down version of the other. It would be absurd, Leibniz remarks, “… to say that the painter is the author of all that is real in the two paintings, without however being the author of what is lacking or the disproportion between the larger and the smaller painting… . In effect, what is lacking is nothing more than a simple result of an infallible consequence of that which is positive, without any need for a distinct author [of that which is lacking]. [A.6.3.151] So even if it is true that evil is a privation, this does not have as a consequence that God is not the author of sin. Given that what is positively willed by God is a sufficient condition for the existence of the evil state of affairs, in virtue of willing what is positive in some state of affairs, God is also the author of what is privative in that state of affairs. [A similar early critique is found at A.6.3.544].”

I find the concept of “privation” to have merit. It’s dismissal is perhaps due to one or two what I consider to be basic misunderstandings. The first is the misunderstanding of why God created anything in the first place. I think it is clear from scripture that the objective of creation is God’s communion with mankind. For example, from the fact that the Christ, the Lamb of God, was ordained for the redemption of man “before the foundations of the world..” 1Peter 1:20. A second, and perhaps subsequent problem, is the interchanging of the words evil and sin. This is confusing. The writer doesn't seem to appreciate the possibility that while sin is always explained by evil, evil as we know it may have come from something other than what it is. And this other something might be entirely compatible with theism. In fact it might be essential to the expression of God and the knowledge of good.

Communion with God implies the will, thus choice, thus knowledge. It was fundamental that man should know God. What does it mean to know God, or even to know about God? Does it mean to know the difference between a body and a spirit, physical and metaphysical? If we say we know God, to what knowledge are we referring? Are we not referring to a knowledge of the Godly attributes; to His goodness? And how do we experience God’s goodness? The knowledge of God’s goodness is experienced in contrast to the pain and suffering resulting from evil. The wages of sin is weighed against the gift of God; death against life. Mankind’s experience of God, his knowledge of God, was the primary objective of creation. All other aspects of creation are measures to achieve this objective.

God created a universe where mankind could know Him by cognitive processes. Might God have created mankind to know Him by some other means? The answer is certianly “No.” Christ’s prayer in the Garden affirms this fact: “Father if it be possible, let this cup pass from me.” Surely if it were possible for God to achieve communion with man by any other means the omniscient God would have known as much before He began creating. Furthermore, certainly being made in the image of God is what informs our cognitive means of knowing and experiencing. We can be assured that God created the intelligible universe and a reasoning mankind perfectly in alignment with His objective. No other arrangement would have served. Things are the way they had to be.

Mankind reasons and learns by cognition, experiencing only contrast. It was therefore inevitable that for God’s purpose, both good and evil should exist. At the same time, it cannot be that God would create either acts of evil, or the evil force behind acts of evil. At this point I am going to introduce a couple of terms. I’m going to refer to evil per se.’ By this I will mean all kinds of evil as we know it in the world today. This I do not believe that God created. The second term I will introduce is the term not-God. By this I refer to something like what the article above calls "privation."

To avoid assuming too much about this idea of not-God, let's just call it an antithetical ideology. It is important to understand that our concept of evil per se’ is characterized by evil’s expression; that is, thoughts and acts that are contrary to good - the nature of God. In its original state, however, I imagine this not-God to have no expression and no character. Thomas Aquinas, who is possibly the originator of the idea of evil as privation, explains that evil (the privation, the not-God) cannot of itself be a nature. Natures consist of acts and potential. And so I reason that not-God becomes evil per se' only by action. (Aquinas, The Compendium of Theology: Good and Evil 108-122.) Therefore it could not be conceptualized as evil per se’. In fact, it could hardly be conceptualized at all. But it must exist.

Why must not-God necessarily exist? Since we must know God by cognitive process, something must exist in contrast to that which God desires us to know about Him. Otherwise we would not experience those things about God. C.S. Lewis suggests something very much like this in the first chapter of "The Problem of Pain." Practically speaking, those things would not exist in our experience. At the first moment of time, “ the beginning,” when God began to express Himself intelligibly, the antithetical not-God came into existence axiomatically. Consider the poetic lines of Isaiah 45:7

“I make light and create darkness.
I make peace and create evil”

There is a motif suggested in the first line, that explains the second line. We can understand how that light and darkness are spatial counterparts. Our experience of one implies the existence of the other. It is the same with peace and evil. However, I do not think the verse in Isaiah necessarily implies evil per se.’ Rather I think it implies the contrasting natures of God and not-God, or fullness and void. So that in expressing His nature, God did not also create evil per se.’ Though He did necessarily create not-God - the contrast against which He might be experienced - and certainly did anticipate its tragic role.

Now, specifically regarding the essence of not-God, again, as I imagine, in the beginnng it was not evil per se’ - ungodly thoughts or ungodly deeds. Though, the execution of any act or thought originating in the domain of not-God would necessarily be ungodly.

As an analogy, suppose you happen to come upon an active credit card someone has dropped. Remarkably, for whatever reason, instead of the usual embossed name, the card is smooth and blank. Out of curiosity you try it out at a cash machine, and it works. You cannot return it to any person or any establishment, because it has no markings. Though your possession of the card does not constitute a crime, any use of the card on your part will be unethical, if not illegal. Similarly, the not-God was not of itself evil per se’. Yet acting upon, or within it could constitute nothing other than evil per se’. I believe Satan and certain angels were created to officiate within the not-God; to have dominion of it; to have possession of the bad credit card, if you will. As lord of that domain, any action on Satan’s part would constitute some form of rebellion; thus the beginning of evil per se’. This in turn laid the path concerning man's knowledge of good and evil; which was inevitable if mankind were to come to know God intimately.

Allow me to quickly address a question that is likely now on the minds of many readers. Do angels have moral choice? In my opinion they do not. Angels must exist in only one of the following states.

1) Angels know good and evil, but cannot do evil; they are intrinsically good. But this is wrong for three reasons. First, if angels know good and evil, and are intrinsically good, then they are morally equal with God. That cannot be. Second, since Satan and one third of the angels fell, angels cannot be intrinsically good. Third, if angels could be created intrinsically good why could mankind not have been created intrinsically good?
2) Angels know good and evil, but they are not intrinsically good. Like man, angels can choose between good and evil.* If this were true, then eventually every angel would fail; thus being all damned or requiring continual grace and forgiveness. Would this not then require a sacrifice? If angels could receive grace and forgiveness sine sacrificium, then why would the sacrifice of Christ have been necessary to atone for mankind.
3) Angels do not have moral choice. Angels were created to play particular roles - some for evil, some for good. Satan and the fallen angels were created for evil in order to bring about the maturity of the Body of Christ for God’s eternal purpose. If this is true, then of all creation, only mankind has been given moral choice, and the possibility of knowing God and of sharing His glory.

Now, you might argue that in creating some angels for evil God was unfair. In the first place fairness is not a virtue. It’s an opinion. In the second place, care for Satan was not the object of God’s creation. God owes nothing to His creation. Satan was created to play a role. Satan was not given passions as men and women have. Satan could not love. Satan could not honor. Satan could not regret, feel guilt or conviction. All of these require a conscience, a knowledge of good and evil. God was just in creating Satan for whatever purpose He chose. God is righteous. Not because we feel that He is. Not because we affirm that He is. But because He is. God is synonymous with righteousness.

Arguing against the idea of privation, the SEP discussion cites an analogy of the donut and the donut hole. The author argues the point, if I understand it, that making a cake does not necessarily result in the making of a hole. The hole only exists because of the shape of the cake. A hole does not exist due to the absence of a cake. This is true. A cake does not have to have a hole, and a hole does not imply the existence of a cake. But this analogy doesn’t fit the problem, because cake and hole are not opposites. They are not spatial counterparts. On the other hand, light and darkness, peace and evil, God and not-God are opposites. They are spatial counterparts. In the intelligible universe, the expression of the one implies the existence of the other.

Leibniz rejected the notion that evil as a privation resolved the Holiness problem. Since his theodicy hinged upon the sovereignty and divine authority of God, he felt the whole notion superfluous. He uses the analogy of a painter who paints two paintings, identical in every way apart from size. Leibniz argues that just as the painter is the author of each painting, he would also be the author of whatever is lacking due to the difference in their sizes. Once again, though, the two paintings are not opposites. They are not spatial counterparts. One can exist without the other. Leibniz seems in effect to argue that God alone can account for the existence of evil per se'. Yet, in the analogy of the painings Leibniz is in a sense correct. God is the author of the privation, or the lack. The problem is that Leibniz is not accounting for the possibility of a progression from the privation, or not-God, to evil per se', such as I have explained. And so Leibniz must still explain how the holy God can have created evil per se'.

In my argument I do not deny that God is the creator of evil, that is, of not-God. I do deny that God is the creator of evil per se’. So, then, not-God results from God's self-expression via His intelligible creation. Evil per se' is the inevitable effect of any activity within not-God. In this way God did create evil, and is completely compatible with it.

*Genesis 3:5”…you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” Some interpret “like God” to mean like gods referring to angels. However, the word elohim in this text refers to the plural God.

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